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HOBBY LOBBY AND THE
PATHOLOGY OF CITIZENS UNITED
ELLEN D. KATZ
INTRODUCTION
1

Four years ago, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
held that for-profit corporations possess a First Amendment right to
make independent campaign expenditures. In so doing, the United
States Supreme Court invited speculation that such corporations
2
might possess other First Amendment rights as well. The petitioners
3
in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius are now arguing that
for-profit corporations are among the intended beneficiaries of the
4
Free Exercise Clause and, along with the respondents in Sebelius v.
5
Hobby Lobby Stores, that they also qualify as “persons” under the
6
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Neither suggestion
follows inexorably from Citizens United, and the role of the case in
7
the pending disputes remains to be seen. Still, it seems fair to say that
the Court’s fidelity to the concept of corporate personhood espoused
in Citizens United will shape how it evaluates the pending religious
liberty cases.
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* Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Analysis: The Personhood of Corporations, SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan. 21, 2010, 6:45 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/analysis-the-personhood-ofcorporations/.
3. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 13-356 (U.S. argued Mar. 25, 2014).
4. Brief for Petitioners at 25–26, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 13356 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2014).
5. 723 F.3d 1114, 1128 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (Nov. 26, 2013).
6. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to
2000bb-4 (2012)); Brief for Petitioners, supra note 4, at 24–25; Brief for Respondents at 25–26,
Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. Feb. 10, 2014).
7. Many of the briefs filed in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
cases do not mention Citizens United at all, and others do so only in passing. See, e.g., Brief for
Petitioners, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2014).
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Setting aside the specific arguments about religious freedom, this
Article focuses on a distinct way Citizens United promises to influence
Conestoga Wood Specialties, Hobby Lobby, and a host of cases to
come. Specifically, Citizens United approached precedent in a manner
that will likely affect, and radiate well beyond, the current challenges
8
to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). In brief,
Citizens United read a number of prior decisions to adopt rules that
those decisions deliberately chose not to espouse. This is not an
entirely new move for the Court as it has previously cast off a
9
decision’s doctrinal limits and stated normative claims. The
contribution of Citizens United, however, is to normalize this stance.
The Roberts Court seems increasingly comfortable approaching
precedent just as it did in that case. This Article identifies this move as
a consistent practice across a number of decisions, and explains both
why it is likely to be used in the pending ACA cases and beyond, and
why it is cause for deep concern.
I. THE PUZZLING USE OF PRECEDENT IN CITIZENS UNITED
In holding that for-profit corporations possess a First Amendment
right to make independent campaign expenditures, Citizens United
struck down a federal law as unconstitutional, overruled one prior
10
decision in its entirety, and scrapped a substantial portion of another.
The Court insisted that these earlier decisions had been anomalies
and that other precedent dictated the holding in Citizens United. As a
matter of reading precedent, this was puzzling.
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, for example, credited First
11
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti as the case in which the Court
“rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other
associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment
12
simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’” But
Bellotti never rejected this argument. At issue in Bellotti was the
constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute that prohibited
corporations from making campaign contributions or expenditures
8. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
9. See infra notes 38–45 and accompanying text.
10. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (overruling Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) and portions of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93
(2003)).
11. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
12. Citizen United, 558 U.S at 343 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776).
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“for the purpose of . . . influencing or affecting the vote” on a
13
referendum. Several banking associations and corporations that
wanted to spend money to oppose a proposed income tax challenged
14
the state law on First Amendment grounds. The Court sustained the
challenge, and in so doing rejected the notion that “speech that
otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment
15
loses that protection simply because its source is a corporation.”
The Bellotti Court, however, did not reject the argument that
corporate political speech should be treated differently under the
16
First Amendment from the political speech of “‘natural persons.’” In
fact, the Bellotti majority expressed no doubt whatsoever that political
speech by corporations could be regulated more extensively than
17
political speech by individuals. It never questioned the well18
established principle, invoked by the Bellotti dissenters, that
corporations were artificial, state-created institutions vested with
special privileges that justified additional regulation in the political
sphere. Instead, the Bellotti majority crafted what it described as a
limited exception to that principle. It held that the State could not
block corporate expenditures made in connection with referenda both
because corporate influence posed less concern in such elections and
because corporate expenditures in referenda served the First
19
Amendment interests of others. In so holding, the Court stated
explicitly that it was not ruling that corporations themselves
20
possessed a First Amendment right to engage in such speech.

13. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767–68.
14. Id. at 769.
15. Id. at 784.
16. Citizen United, 558 U.S at 343 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776).
17. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789 (noting the argument that “corporations are wealthy and
powerful and their views may drown out other points of view,” and demonstrating a willingness
to consider, on a proper evidentiary showing, whether “corporate advocacy threatened
imminently to undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than serving First
Amendment interests”).
18. See id. at 809 (White, J., dissenting) (observing that the “special status of corporations
has placed them in a position to control vast amounts of economic power which may, if not
regulated, dominate not only the economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the
electoral process”); id. at 825–26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (observing that “[i]t might
reasonably be concluded” that the “blessings” state law grants to corporations, “so beneficial in
the economic sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere”).
19. Id. at 776, 790 (majority opinion).
20. Id. at 776 (stating that the “Constitution often protects interests broader than those of
the party seeking their vindication” and that “[t]he proper question . . . is not whether
corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights” but whether the challenged statute “abridges
expression the First Amendment was meant to protect”).
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As has been widely observed, Citizens United disregarded these
21
carefully crafted limits. The Court read Bellotti to support precisely
what that decision disavowed, treating the case as authority for the
proposition that a corporation is entitled to make unrestricted
expenditures in connection with any election, not just a referendum,
22
and that a corporation possesses a First Amendment right to do so.
Reading Bellotti this way meant that the “special advantages”
corporations enjoy no longer provided sufficient cause to regulate
corporate political expenditures differently from expenditures made
by individuals. But it was decidedly Citizens United, and not Bellotti,
23
that created this rule.
24
Like Bellotti, Buckley v. Valeo was modified by Citizens United. It
was Buckley, of course, that famously recognized Congress’s power to
regulate campaign finance practices in order to “stem corruption or
25
its appearance.” In so doing, the Buckley Court stated explicitly that
Congress’s power to regulate campaign finance extended beyond
efforts aimed at preventing outright bribery. The Court wrote that the
appearance of corruption is of “almost equal concern as the danger of
actual quid pro quo arrangements” and “the avoidance of the
appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . if confidence in
the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a
26
disastrous extent.’”
Citizens United nevertheless baldly stated that “[w]hen Buckley
identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited
27
to quid pro quo corruption.” This misreading of precedent was of
great consequence. It meant that even if corporate expenditures could
lead to ingratiation and preferential access—something Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion doubted—“[i]ngratiation and access . . .

21. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 442 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The only thing
about Bellotti that could not be clearer is that it declined to adopt the majority's position.”);
Robert L. Kerr, Naturalizing the Artificial Citizen: Repeating Lochner's Error in Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 311, 348 (2010) (noting that Citizens
United “mischaracterizes” Bellotti).
22. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 346–47.
23. See id. at 351 (noting that the advantages corporations enjoy under state law do not
suffice “to allow laws prohibiting speech”).
24. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
25. Id. at 80–81.
26. Id. at 27 (quoting CSC Comm. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565
(1973)).
27. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359.
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28

are not corruption” within the meaning of the Buckley framework.
Reading Buckley this way meant the problem Congress targeted in
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA)—namely, preferential
access and the opportunity to secure influence by making various
campaign-related expenditures—turned out not to be a cognizable
29
problem at all. This, in turn, rendered the BCRA provisions disputed
in Citizens United invalid, given that they limited the way
corporations and unions could fund certain types of advertisements so
30
as to curb the influence these entities exerted over candidates.
31
This holding was new law. To be sure, the idea that the
governmental interest Buckley identified might be “limited to quid
pro quo corruption” did not originate in Citizens United. Several prior
32
dissenting opinions read Buckley as Citizens United did, and by the
time Citizens United was decided, this position had come to command
a majority on the Court. Citizens United accordingly overruled the
portion of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission that held
otherwise, along with an earlier decision that endorsed the same
33
principle. In so doing, however, the Court avoided telling us why
Congress lacked authority to address conduct that fell short of quid
pro quo corruption. Instead, the decision scrapped statutory
provisions that targeted access and influence simply by citing Buckley
for a proposition that Buckley had not endorsed and even disavowed.

28. Id. at 360.
29. See id. at 359.
30. BCRA targeted congressional concerns about influence and preferential access in two
ways: first, by blocking donations of “soft money” to state and national political parties, and
second, by limiting the ability of corporations and unions to fund advertisements that were
intended to endorse or condemn candidates, but that did so without using words such as “elect”
or “vote” and hence that fell outside the preexisting regulatory framework. See id. at 439–40
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Citizens United involved the latter limitation, but its reading of
Buckley, now confirmed in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014),
threatens the soft money ban as well. See Fred Wertheimer, Symposium: The Supreme Court
and the McCutcheon Decision, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 4, 2014, 10:44 AM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2014/04/symposium-the-supreme-court-and-the-mccutcheon-decision/; see also infra note
56 and accompanying text.
31. See generally Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
341 (2009) (explaining the roots of the structural anticorruption principle in the Constitution
and its historical interpretation).
32. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 296–98 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–28 (1976)); Nixon v. Shrink
Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 423 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
33. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) and portions of McConnell, 540 U.S. 93).
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The Buckley Court, of course, might have justified its decision to
invalidate expenditure limits by holding that the prevention of quid
pro quo corruption is the only interest Congress may pursue in this
realm. Bellotti might have similarly defended its decision to allow
corporate expenditures in referenda by dismissing the state-granted
“blessings” corporations enjoy as an insufficient cause to regulate
corporate political activity. But that neither decision did so proved to
be no obstacle to the Court in Citizens United. That those earlier cases
might have held what the Court wanted them to have held was
enough to treat them as though they had.
The Court, of course, knows how to distinguish dicta from holding
and limited holdings from broader ones. Why Citizens United opted
not to follow rather mainstream practice is puzzling. The Court might
have hoped to make its decision look as if it charted less new ground
34
than it did, or maybe it was looking to collapse some analytic steps in
an already lengthy opinion or avoid the difficulty of reasoning its way
to a particular conclusion from first principles.
It is also possible that the way the Court approached precedent in
Citizens United simply reflects a more general jurisprudential
preference for bright light rules over muddier ones. That preference
pervades Citizens United, which both jettisoned the case-specific, as35
applied inquiry that the Court previously used in this realm and
reached out to protect entities that were not even subject to
regulation under BCRA. Regarding the latter, the Court worried that
exempt institutions might ultimately find themselves regulated absent
the broad ruling it issued in the case, and deemed the mere prospect
of regulation a distinct reason to strike down the BCRA provisions in
36
dispute. Rather than waiting to address such regulation with a
targeted rule if and when the regulation actually materialized, the
Court made clear the imagined regulation was foreclosed by a broad
rule that invalidated BCRA’s present application to different
institutions. The Court did so, moreover, not by announcing and
defending its new rule, but instead by insisting that existing precedent
34. If so, it was unsuccessful. See id. at 441–46 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining the
misapplication of precedent by the majority in Citizens United); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens
United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 586–88 (2010); Kerr, supra note
21, at 322.
35. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
36. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352 (describing BCRA’s exemption of media
corporations as “all but an admission of the invalidity of the anti-distortion rationale” and as “a
separate reason” for invalidating the law).
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already established the rule. That precedent, of course, did no such
thing, having itself emerged from a different era that was both more
responsive to context and less committed to bright line rules.
Whatever its reason, reading precedent as the Court did in
Citizens United eliminates the very foundation of what makes it
precedent in the first instance. The practice strips prior decisions of
their limits and the reason why they have normative force for future
cases. It leaves precedent denatured and relegated to a kind of cameo
appearance in a willful construction of decisional history. As such, this
use of precedent is not unlike the abuse of legislative history, wherein
the record of the past becomes little more than a narrative filled with
data points that are mined for supporting arguments. The weight
given to a particular statement or textual provision becomes purely a
matter of perspective and desired outcome, as holdings become
contingent explanations and dicta is transformed into binding rules.
II. THE PATHOLOGY OF CITIZENS UNITED
The Court’s recasting of precedent in Citizens United might be
readily dismissed were the practice simply an aberration or a tactic
selectively employed to resolve a particularly contentious case. After
all, Citizens United was not the first decision in which the Court read
an earlier decision to endorse a proposition the prior case had not
37
espoused. As this Part shows, however, the way Citizens United
treated precedent increasingly looks like standard practice for the
Roberts Court. The approach is evident in several decisions that postdate Citizens United, and promises to (mis)shape decisions to come.
38
Consider, first, Vance v. Ball State University, in which the Court
held that an employee is a supervisor for purposes of establishing
vicarious liability under Title VII only if the employee is authorized to
39
take tangible employment action against the plaintiff. Along the way,
Vance also stated that if the harassing employee is not a supervisor
and simply the victim’s co-worker, the employer is liable only if it
40
negligently failed to control working conditions. Both propositions
37. One example is Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105–06 (2000), which attributed to the
Florida Supreme Court an unwavering commitment to a proposition it never mentioned, much
less endorsed. See also Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court in Politics, in THE UNFINISHED
ELECTION OF 2000 at 105, 149 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2001) (describing this attribution as
“nothing less than a deliberate, bold-faced lie”).
38. 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
39. Id. at 2439.
40. See id. (“[T]he employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working
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are new law, but Vance insisted that precedent had already established
41
the latter. The Court cited Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and
42
Faragher v. Boca Raton, but those decisions simply noted that
43
negligence had been the dominant approach in the lower courts.
Neither decision had occasion to resolve the question in Vance
44
because both earlier cases involved harassment by a supervisor. The
Court itself subsequently recognized that “Ellerth and Faragher
expressed no view on the employer liability standard for co-worker
45
harassment. Nor do we.”
Vance nevertheless cited the earlier cases as if they had resolved
46
just that question. Vance now leaves no doubt that the negligence
standard governs going forward. As my colleague Sam Bagenstos has
explained: “One would think that the Court would have felt the need
to offer some substantive defense of the negligence standard in terms
of the policies that underlie Title VII. But Vance offered no such
47
defense.”
The day after it decided Vance, the Court again asserted that
precedent controlled open questions in the case at hand. Shelby
48
County v. Holder confronted a constitutional challenge to the Voting
Rights Act that the Court had sidestepped four years earlier.
49
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder had
conditions.”)
41. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
42. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
43. See Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 749–52; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799; Samuel R.
Bagenstos, Formalism and Employer Liability Under Title VII 16 (Law & Econ. Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 370, 2014) (“In its pre-Vance cases the Court never held that a
negligence standard of employer liability applied to coworker-on-coworker harassment.”),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2363095.
44. See Bagenstos, supra note 43, at 16 (“Faragher, like Ellerth, was a case involving
harassment by a supervisor, not a coworker, so the standard of employer liability for coworker
harassment was not squarely presented.”).
45. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 143 n.6 (2004); see also Bagenstos, supra note
43, at 16 (explaining how the employer liability standard for co-worker harassment had not been
presented in either Ellerth or Faragher and that any opinion expressed to that end would be
mere dicta).
46. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2441 (2013) (reasoning that “we have
held that an employer is directly liable for an employee’s unlawful harassment if the employer
was negligent with respect to the offensive behavior,” and that Faragher and Ellerth “held that
different rules apply where the harassing employee is the plaintiff’s supervisor”); see also
Bagenstos, supra note 43, at 17 (describing this reading of Ellerth and Faragher as “simply . . .
incorrect” and observing that “those cases did not hold that negligence is the baseline standard
for employer liability under Title VII”).
47. Bagenstos, supra note 43, at 17.
48. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
49. 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
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called the constitutional challenge a serious one, but did not resolve it,
finding instead sufficient statutory grounds on which to dispose of the
50
case. By contrast, Shelby County issued a constitutional ruling, albeit
51
not the one that was widely expected. In so doing, Chief Justice
Roberts’s majority opinion cited four points that Northwest Austin
purportedly “emphasized,” “require[d],” or “stated definitively,” and
that it thought Justice Ginsburg’s dissent inappropriately resolved in a
52
different way. The majority observed that the dissent “analyzes the
question presented as if our decision in Northwest Austin never
53
happened.”
It is debatable whether anything the Shelby County dissent said
was incompatible with the identified statements from Northwest
Austin. But even if the dissent had flatly rejected them, those prior
statements were not binding on the Court in Shelby County. Given
Northwest Austin’s statutory ruling, its constitutional discussion was
dicta. And yet, the Chief Justice’s opinion chastised Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent for failing to adhere to Northwest Austin. Once again, fanciful
precedent filled in for reasoned argument. By treating Northwest
Austin as conclusive, the majority opinion offered no response to
54
Justice Ginsburg’s claims beyond referencing the prior decision. Like
Vance the day before, Shelby County relied on precedent in a manner
that tracked Citizens United, notably, by excising dicta and presenting
it as a binding rule.
This practice seems poised for further deployment in the pending
ACA cases. The lead appellate opinion in Hobby Lobby Stores
already reads as if Citizens United provided the template. A majority
of the Supreme Court may soon agree that it should, particularly in
light of the structural similarities between the precedent used in
Citizens United and the decisions that bear on the ACA dispute.
The Court is likely to view the alterations Citizens United made to
Bellotti as authority in the pending ACA cases to reject distinctions
between corporations and individuals based on the “special
55
advantages” corporations enjoy. The Court’s most recent campaign
finance decision already treated the limits that Citizens United read

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 205–07.
See generally Ellen D. Katz, Dismissing Deterrence, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 248 (2014).
Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2622, 2630.
Id.
See id.
See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.

KATZ 6.10.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

32

12/20/2014 4:32 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 9:1

56

into Buckley as black letter doctrine. It seems probable that the
ACA decisions will view the revisions Citizens United made to Bellotti
as similarly settled law. Needless to say, these revisions provide a
foundation on which to recognize corporate free exercise rights,
should the Court be inclined to do so.
Even as revised, however, Bellotti provides no more than a
foundation for such a holding. Standing alone, Bellotti is not sufficient
authority to hold that for-profit corporations are persons under
RFRA or that the Free Exercise Clause protects them. And yet, the
Court may well find sufficient authority for these propositions in
other precedent implicated by the ACA cases. This precedent appears
acutely susceptible to revisionist reading along the Citizens United
template, given that the prior cases on this point stand in a similar
relation to Conestoga Wood Specialties and Hobby Lobby Stores as
Bellotti did to Citizens United.
The precedent at issue in the ACA cases recognized free exercise
claims brought by churches and related institutions organized as non57
profit corporations under relevant state laws, and by individuals
58
engaged in for-profit business activities. These decisions make clear
that back in 1994, when Congress enacted RFRA, and indeed ever
since, the Free Exercise Clause has been understood to protect both
individuals and groups engaged in religious practices and individuals
engaged in selected business activities. Free exercise claims have been
pressed by a religious sect seeking an exemption from federal drug
59
laws that banned sacramental use of a hallucinogenic tea, a church
60
challenging a city ordinance that banned ritual animal sacrifice, an
Amish carpenter seeking an exemption from paying Social Security

56. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014) (attributing to both Buckley and
Citizens United the rule that, in the realm of campaign finance, “Congress may target only a
specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption”).
57. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficent União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 427–39
(2006) (recognizing a free exercise claim brought by “a Christian Spiritualist sect” seeking an
exemption from federal law so members could receive communion in the form of sacramental
tea); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525 (1993)
(recognizing a free exercise claim brought by a “not-for-profit corporation organized under
Florida law” challenging an ordinance that banned ritual animal sacrifice, a practice required by
the Santeria religion).
58. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting an Amish carpenter’s free
enterprise claim seeking exemption from Social Security taxes on behalf of Amish employees);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (rejecting a free-exercise challenge brought by Jewish
individuals running businesses and seeking exemption from Sunday closing laws).
59. See O Centro, 546 U.S. at 439.
60. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 541–43.
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61

taxes on behalf of his Amish employees, and Jewish merchants
62
pursuing relief from Sunday closing laws.
None of these cases, however, involved for-profit corporations and
thus they did not address the specific questions presented in the ACA
dispute. That is, they did not consider whether for-profit corporations
63
are among the intended beneficiaries of the Free Exercise Clause or
whether they should be considered to be among the “persons”
64
Congress meant to protect when it enacted RFRA.
The lead appellate opinion in Hobby Lobby nevertheless read
these cases as if they did. The opinion specifically rejected the idea
that the free exercise claims brought by the individual plaintiffs in
65
66
United States v. Lee and Braunfeld v. Brown would have
67
“disappeared” had their for-profit businesses been incorporated. The
supposition is that the plaintiffs would have been permitted to press
their free exercise claims had they been for-profit corporations. That,
of course, is the question presented in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
Wood Specialties, but Lee and Braunfeld did not come close to
resolving it. On the day the Court decided Braunfeld, it also
concluded specifically that it “need not decide” the question whether
an incorporated supermarket pressing a free exercise challenge to a
68
Sunday closing law had standing. The Court observed that the
individual plaintiffs in Braunfeld had lost on the merits despite
bringing allegations that were more “grave” than those pressed by the
supermarket, and hence concluded that it did not need to resolve
69
whether a for-profit corporation might press a similar challenge.
In other words, Braunfeld fell well short of recognizing the Free
Exercise Clause to protect for-profit corporations. Decisions like
Braunfeld and Lee never intimated that for-profit corporations might

61. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 261.
62. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 610.
63. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 4, at 25–26.
64. Id. at 24–25; Brief for Respondents, supra note 6, at 25–26.
65. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
66. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
67. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013) (arguing
that the Court’s “analysis did not turn on the individuals’ unincorporated status” and that the
Court did not “suggest that the Free Exercise right would have disappeared, using a more
modern formulation, in a general or limited partnership, sole professional corporation, LLC, Scorp, or closely held family business like we have here”), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (Nov. 26,
2013).
68. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 631 (1961).
69. See id.
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resemble individuals for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause, or that
free exercise rights necessarily attach to all types of profit-seeking
activities. At most, they recognized that the Free Exercise Clause
might extend beyond the narrow limits of individual religious practice
and protect individuals engaged in other activities despite their profitseeking motives. Read in conjunction with decisions recognizing free
exercise claims brought by churches, these decisions do not foreclose
the claims pressed in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood Specialties.
But they do not endorse them either.
In this sense, these decisions bear considerable resemblance to
Bellotti. Citizens United notwithstanding, Bellotti itself never
questioned that the political activities of corporations could be
regulated more extensively than the political activities of individuals.
Instead, Bellotti crafted what it described as a limited exception to
that principle, making clear along the way that it was not ruling that
corporations themselves possessed a First Amendment right to
70
engage in political speech.
Lee and Braunfeld, of course, might have recognized the Free
Exercise Clause to protect anyone engaged in a profit-seeking activity,
be they individuals or for-profit corporations. Like Bellotti, however,
these decisions were more limited. They do not preclude the Court
from reasoning its way from constitutional free exercise principles to
a broader rule in the pending cases. The Court, however, may see no
need to do so. Insofar as the treatment of Bellotti in Citizens United is
any indication, Conestoga Wood Specialties and Hobby Lobby Stores
may simply read these earlier decisions as establishing the broader
principles the Court would prefer they had endorsed. The lead
appellate opinion in Hobby Lobby Stores already read Lee and
Braunfeld this way. The Court, too, may be inclined to equate the
Court’s earlier failure to foreclose a particular possibility with a
binding conclusion on that very point.
Should the ACA cases follow this path, they would likely replicate
another defining feature of Citizens United, namely, the way the Court
addressed its concern about institutions BCRA exempted from
regulation. Citizens United deemed the possibility that BCRA-exempt
institutions might one day be regulated sufficient reason to strike
71
down BCRA’s present application to other institutions. Like BCRA,

70. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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ACA regulations exempt certain employers from some requirements
and offer a temporary safe harbor to others. Tracking Citizens United,
the lead appellate opinion in Hobby Lobby voiced concern that
presently exempt institutions might one day lose their exemption, and
thus read applicable precedent to accord constitutional protection
both to those exempted and to those now subject to the
72
requirements.
The Justices may similarly view the prospect that the ACA might
be applied to exempt institutions to bolster or perhaps to provide a
standalone reason to scrap its application to the plaintiffs in the
pending cases. The Court might, moreover, insist this prospect is
foreclosed because existing precedent already bars the ACA’s
extension to the plaintiffs in these cases. In other words, the Court
might simply follow the template Citizens United provided.
CONCLUSION
Construing precedent is an essential part of what judges do. They
routinely disagree about the precise meaning and scope of prior
holdings. And yet, this debate neither includes nor allows the
systematic treatment of dicta as holding to preclude reasoning and
shed accountability. Put differently, the Court’s use of precedent in
Citizens United and in subsequent cases falls well outside responsible
judicial practice.
During his confirmation hearings, then-Judge Roberts famously
espoused the value of judicial minimalism and professed an abiding
73
respect for precedent. Several commentators have argued that
74
minimalism in the Roberts Court has proven illusive. Opinions that
appear facially limited in scope are, in fact, remarkably far-reaching,
72. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1125, 1143–44 (10th Cir. 2013),
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (Nov. 26, 2013)
73. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts to be Chief Justice of
the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56 (2005) (noting that
“[j[udges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they apply them. . . . I will remember
that it's my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat,” and that “judges have to have
the humility to recognize that they operate within a system of precedent, shaped by other judges
equally striving to live up to the judicial oath”).
74. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. &
MARY. L. REV. 713 (2014); Adam Liptak, Roberts Pulls Supreme Court to the Right Step by
Step, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2013, at A1; Emily Bazelon, The Devastating, Sneaky Genius of John
Roberts’ Opinions, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2014, 5:41 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news
_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/04/supreme_court_s_mccutcheon_ruling_john_roberts_opinio
n_wrecks_what_remains.html; Brianne Gorod, The False Minimalism of John Roberts,
ELECTION LAW BLOG (Apr. 8, 2014, 8:24 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=60202.
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either because they allow for political or administrative action that
will not be forthcoming, or because they postpone resolution of a
critical question while leaving little doubt about how a majority of the
75
Court will resolve it in the next case. Either way, the seemingly
limited nature of these holdings is misleading. In principle, subsequent
action might minimize their impact, but in practice the decisions have
sweeping consequences.
This Article has shown how the respect for precedent that thenJudge Roberts professed is systematically connected to the realization
or destruction of the judicial minimalism he celebrated. Decisions that
postpone resolution of a disputed question technically allow the
Court to change course. At a minimum, they provide the opportunity
to reflect upon the question, engage with new arguments and facts,
and, at least in principle, reach unexpected results. But the prospect
for such engagement exists only if the Court is willing to treat open
questions as open. Increasingly, that is something this Court appears
unwilling to do.

75. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and
Public Law, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2014); Richard M. Re, The Doctrine of One Last Chance, 17
GREEN BAG 2d 173 (2014).

